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ABSTRACT
In this paper, the ongoing research of the author on de-
signing an automated negotiator is described. One of the
key challenges of designing a successful negotiation agent is
that usually only limited information is available about the
other party. Therefore, we need to combine various learning
techniques to decide what offers to make, and when to ac-
cept. Our goal is to investigate techniques for developing a
versatile automated negotiator that can effectively conduct
negotiations in an incomplete information setting.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial In-
telligence—intelligent agents, multi-agent systems
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation, Performance, Theory
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1. INTRODUCTION
Negotiation is an important activity in human society, and
is studied by various disciplines, ranging from economics and
game theory [15], to electronic commerce [9], social psychol-
ogy, and artificial intelligence [10, 12].
Traditionally, negotiation is a necessary, but also time-
consuming and expensive activity. Therefore, in the last
decades there has been a large interest in the automation
of negotiation [7, 9, 10], for example in the setting of e-
commerce [14]. This interest is fueled by the promise of au-
tomated agents eventually being able to negotiate on behalf
of human negotiators.
One of the key challenges for a successful negotiation is
that usually only limited information is available about the
other party. Despite the fact that sharing private informa-
tion can result in mutual gains, negotiators are often un-
willing to share this information to avoid exploitation. This
problem can be partially overcome by learning from the of-
fers that are exchanged during the negotiation. This can be
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done in many ways, ranging from strategy prediction (“what
will the opponent do?”) to preference estimation (“what does
the opponent want?”).
What is learnt about the opponent can then be used to
improve the decision of what offers to make, and what offers
to accept. For example, in order to send out bids that are
beneficial to the opponent (thereby increasing the chances of
reaching a deal), it is necessary to estimate the opponent’s
preferences. Conversely, when the agent is presented with
an offer by the opponent, strategy prediction may help in
deciding what to do next. The agent has to make a choice
between accepting the offer that is currently on the table, or
rejecting it and continuing the negotiation; both options in-
volve an inherent risk, and predicting the opponent’s future
offers is essential for making the right decision.
2. APPROACH
Every year, automated negotiation agents are improving
in various ways, and there is now a large body of nego-
tiation strategies available, all with their unique strengths
and weaknesses (for an exposition, see [1, 7]). For example,
some agents are able to predict the opponent’s preferences
very well, while others focus more on having a sophisticated
bidding strategy. Naturally, we would like to learn from
previous approaches, and improve upon them, in order to
create a versatile and generic negotiating agent.
However, most agents are designed to function in very
different environments, so there is no straightforward way
to compare different approaches, let alone combine them.
Therefore, our approach has been as follows: first of all, we
created a generic negotiation environment called Genius [13],
which can fully support a diversity of different negotiation
protocols, scenarios, and agents. Second, we amended the
Genius repository with various existing agents [8], scenar-
ios [11], and protocols [15] from literature. Additionally,
we organized a yearly international negotiation competition
(ANAC) [1, 6] to harvest even more strategies and scenar-
ios, and to learn new, improved approaches to effective agent
design.
With this in place, we were able to pinpoint additional
structure in most agent designs. We identified three main
components of a general negotiation strategy; namely a bid-
ding strategy, possibly an opponent model, and an accep-
tance strategy (BOA) [4]. These BOA components enable
us to do two things: first, they allow us to study the behav-
ior and performance of individual components; and second,
they make it possible to systematically explore the space
of possible negotiation strategies by recombining different
components.
We started with the first part: seeking out the best of each
BOA component. We mainly focused on the logical start-
ing points, namely the opponent modeling and acceptance
mechanism components.
For opponent modeling, there was no recent overview of
the field available, so we conducted a survey of currently
existing opponent modeling techniques (to appear, see Sec-
tion 3). In tandem with surveying the state of the art, we
studied the performance of a variety of different opponent
models, and we concluded that simple heuristics usually
outperform more sophisticated methods such as Bayesian
learning [2]. We believe this is due to the fact that usually,
the simple methods assume less about the opponent, which
makes them more robust in everyday negotiation settings.
For the acceptance mechanisms, we studied and classi-
fied current approaches in [5]. We found that designing a
good acceptance mechanism amounts to solving the accep-
tance dilemma: accepting bad to mediocre offers yields more
agreements of relatively low utility, while accepting only the
best offers produces less agreements, but of higher utility.
Most of the current acceptance mechanisms are on either
side of the extreme, and this insight led us to believe that
more consideration has to be given to exactly what is the
right time to accept. Consequently, we have adopted a more
principled approach in [3], where we calculate the optimal
time to accept when estimates of the opponent’s future be-
havior is available.
3. FUTUREWORK
The next steps in our research revolve around a number
of themes. First, we believe there is still room for improve-
ment in both opponent preference estimation and strategy
prediction methods, and we think online genetic algorithms
can be promising in this regard. Also, learning across mul-
tiple negotiation sessions (against different opponents, and
across different scenarios) has not yet received much atten-
tion, but ANAC 2013 will incorporate such learning mecha-
nisms, which we hope will stimulate research in this area.
Second, we believe there is still a lot of research to be
conducted in terms of the bidding strategy. Research in
automated negotiation has mostly focused on learning tech-
niques, but it is still rather unclear what to do with the
information once it is learned.
Lastly, after analyzing all components separately, we have
begun working on putting the pieces back together again.
We are basically interested in three questions:
• Does combining the best of each component in the end
create the best strategy?
• Which component is the most important with respect
to the agent’s performance?
• What aspects of the opponent should we learn, and
what measures can we use to predict a good outcome?
We hope in the end, this will shed some light on where re-
searchers should direct their effort and time when designing
a negotiating agent.
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